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EXCERPTS FROM
 ROGERS TESTIMONY
before SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS Committee
ON SUBJECT OF ABM
CONSTRUCTION IN USSR

Senator Case

Q. I think the greatest reason for concern about ABM in connection with disarmament is not its possible effect on deterring the Russians from coming to the bargaining table. I think they want to come. It isn't even a question of the cost, although the waste of money is outrageous. A bigger concern is its effect in the escalation of the arms race itself, and bringing us to a higher level of armament on both sides in which condition we will be much less able to negotiate effective arms reduction among other reasons because at a higher and more sophisticated level of armaments on both sides, we will be unable to be sure without the kind of inspection the Russians will never permit that they are abiding by their agreement.

It's this kind of effect that we're most concerned about from the use of—from the deployment of ABM, and

your suggestion that it had no effect because the Russians are still anxious to come to negotiate with us doesn't meet that point at all, Mr. Secretary.

MR. FULBRIGHT. I agree with that.

A. Can I comment on that, sir. Suppose we start our talks in a few months and the first thing that's said by the Soviet Union is, "Let's do away with our defensive missiles." We'd have no problem. We'd be delighted. Well why does that—why is the fact that we're thinking about starting a development—why is that going to make it difficult?

Soviet Hawks vs. Doves

Well I think, Mr. Secretary, we have to realize that in this country and in Russia also there are different forces contending for control of national policy, the hawks if you will and the doves, if you will—those who want to negotiate, those who fear negotiation, those who believe only in armed force, and whatnot.

And any effort that we make along this line that can be interpreted by the hawks in Russia as reason for them to take control of the situation and put down those who want to negotiate effectively as you do, as the chairman does, as most Americans do, I think any move of that sort is terribly important, and that is the reason we are almost passionately dedicated to not to doing anything that isn't essential here. And we have had no evidence that this is in any way essential.

MR. FULBRIGHT. I agree with what he says. He says it more forcefully than I.

A. Senator, do you suggest, or do you think that the President's decision on Safeguard has been a blow to the doves in the Soviet Union?

Q. I think without any question is has.

A. I must say I don't believe that the Soviet Union thinks that way. They know exactly the problems we're having with the Congress.

We know that there's a lot of public opposition. I can't for a moment believe that this is going to be that great a shock to the Soviet Union particularly when they have their own defensive missile systems all around Moscow.

Q. What happened when they put up their defensive system or started to and they have reduced it, as you know, 50 per cent, roughly, from their original plan because it isn't working?

A. I don't know whether we can be sure of that.

Q. Up to now they have limited their construction and deployment.

A. They have a great many of them around Moscow. We don't know for sure. People say that they won't work. But we don't know.

Q. Well the testimony we've had is very clear on this.

MR. FULBRIGHT. The Director of the CIA told us as much. I mean he's as good an authority as anybody.

A. Well that's a suspicion. I mean we expect that they probably are—we know when they deploy them. I don't mean that. But why they have not continued the deployment we're not sure but we think they may be having some trouble but we don't know.

Q. Let me just illustrate from our own experience with them. They deployed this system or started to. Our immediate reaction, and I do not criticize it—how could I?—was to develop multiple re-entry missiles—warheads on our missiles so as to give us the capacity to overwhelm that defense. This raised the level of armaments on both sides to a degree higher than it was before and this is the concern that we have about our action here.

A. I understand your concern. But if the Soviet Union when we start these talks indicate that they want to get out of the defensive missile business we can get out of it very quickly. We're not even in it until 1973.